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THE SET-THEORETIC UNIVERSE V IS NOT NECESSARILY A
CLASS-FORCING EXTENSION OF HOD
JOEL DAVID HAMKINS AND JONAS REITZ
Abstract. In light of the celebrated theorem of Vopeˇnka [VH72], proving in
ZFC that every set is generic over HOD, it is natural to inquire whether the
set-theoretic universe V must be a class-forcing extension of HOD by some
possibly proper-class forcing notion in HOD. We show, negatively, that if ZFC
is consistent, then there is a model of ZFC that is not a class-forcing extension
of its HOD for any class forcing notion definable in HOD and with definable
forcing relations there (allowing parameters). Meanwhile, S. Friedman [Fri12]
showed, positively, that if one augments HOD with a certain ZFC-amenable
class A, definable in V , then the set-theoretic universe V is a class-forcing
extension of the expanded structure 〈HOD,∈, A〉. Our result shows that this
augmentation process can be necessary. The same example shows that V is not
necessarily a class-forcing extension of the mantle, and the method provides
counterexamples to the intermediate model property, namely, a class-forcing
extension V ⊆W ⊆ V [G] with an intermediate transitive inner model W that
is neither a class-forcing extension of V nor a ground model of V [G] by any
definable class forcing notion with definable forcing relations.
1. Introduction
In 1972, Vopeˇnka proved the following celebrated result.
Theorem 1 (Vopeˇnka [VH72]). If V = L[A] where A is a set of ordinals, then V
is a forcing extension of the inner model HOD.
The result is now standard, appearing in Jech [Jec03, p. 249] and elsewhere, and
the usual proof establishes a stronger result, stated in ZFC simply as the assertion:
every set is generic over HOD. In other words, for every set a there is a forcing
notion B ∈ HOD and a HOD-generic filter G ⊆ B for which a ∈ HOD[G] ⊆ V . The
full set-theoretic universe V is therefore the union of all these various set-forcing
generic extensions HOD[G].
It is natural to wonder whether these various forcing extensions HOD[G] can be
unified or amalgamated to realize V as a single class-forcing extension of HOD by
a possibly proper class forcing notion in HOD. We expect that it must be a very
high proportion of set theorists and set-theory graduate students, who upon first
learning of Vopeˇnka’s theorem, immediately ask this question.
Main Question. Must the set-theoretic universe V be a class-forcing extension of
HOD?
The research of the second author has been supported in part by PSC-CUNY grant 69095-
00-47. This article grew out of an exchange of the authors on MathOverflow [Rei13; Ham13],
which led to the main technique. Questions and commentary on this article can be made at
http://jdh.hamkins.org/the-universe-need-not-be-a-class-forcing-extension-of-hod.
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We intend the question to be asking more specifically whether the universe V
arises as a bona-fide class-forcing extension of HOD, in the sense that there is a
class forcing notion P, possibly a proper class, which is definable in HOD and which
has definable forcing relation p  ϕ(τ) there for any desired first-order formula ϕ,
such that V arises as a forcing extension V = HOD[G] for some HOD-generic filter
G ⊆ P, not necessarily definable.
In this article, we shall answer the question negatively, by providing a model of
ZFC that cannot be realized as such a class-forcing extension of its HOD.
Main Theorem. If ZFC is consistent, then there is a model of ZFC which is not
a forcing extension of its HOD by any class forcing notion definable in that HOD
and having a definable forcing relation there.
Throughout this article, when we say that a class is definable, we mean that it
is definable in the first-order language of set theory allowing set parameters.
The main theorem should be placed in contrast to the following result of Sy
Friedman, which we discuss in section 5.
Theorem 2 (Friedman [Fri12]). There is a definable class A, which is strongly
amenable to HOD, such that the set-theoretic universe V is a generic extension of
〈HOD,∈, A〉.
This is a postive answer to the main question, if one is willing to augment HOD
with a class A that may not be definable in HOD. Our main theorem shows that
in general, this kind of augmentation process is necessary.
In section 6, we extend our analysis to provide a model of ZFC which cannot arise
as a class-forcing extension of its mantle, by any class forcing notion definable in
the mantle. And in section 7, we consider the intermediate model property for class
forcing, the question of whether every transitive inner modelW that is intermediate
V ⊆W ⊆ V [G] between a ground model V and a class-forcing extension V [G] must
itself arise as a class-forcing extension of V .
2. Some set-theoretic background
An object is definable in a model if it satisfies a property in that model that only
it satisfies. In a model of set theory, a set is ordinal-definable if it satisfies a property,
expressible in the first-order language of set theory with some ordinal parameters,
such that only it has that property with those parameters. Although this is a model-
theoretic definition, undertaken from an outside-the-universe perspective making
reference to a truth predicate (in order to speak of which objects and how many
satisfy the given formula), nevertheless it is a remarkable fact that in a model of ZF
set theory, we can define the class of ordinal-definable sets internally. Namely, in
set theory we define OD as the class of sets a such that for some ordinal θ, the set a
is ordinal-definable in the set structure 〈Vθ,∈〉. In ZF, we have truth predicates for
every set structure, including the structures 〈Vθ,∈〉, and so this definition can be
carried out internally in ZF, defining a certain class. The remarkable observation
is that if a happens actually to be ordinal-definable in the full universe 〈V,∈〉, then
it is the unique object satisfying ϕ(a, ~α) for some formula ϕ and ordinals ~α, and by
the reflection theorem there is some Vθ for which this property is true in Vθ, and
so a will be defined by ϕ(·, ~α) in Vθ, placing a ∈ OD. Conversely, if a ∈ OD, then a
is defined by some (internal) formula ϕ(·, ~α) in Vθ, and this is enough to conclude
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that a is ordinal definable in V , because a is the unique object that satisfies ϕ(a, ~α)
in Vθ.
1
Having defined OD, we define the class HOD of hereditarily ordinal-definable
sets, which are the sets a whose transitive closure is contained in OD. So a is
ordinal definable, as well as all of its elements and elements-of-elements and so on.
It follows that HOD is a transitive class containing all the ordinals, and it is an
elementary observation, originally due to Go¨del, to prove that HOD is a model of
ZFC. From the fact that the objects of HOD are there in virtue of a definition with
ordinal parameters, it follows that in V we may define a global well-order of HOD.
Several of the arguments will rely on the concept of a satisfaction class or truth
predicate. Specifically, a class Tr is a satisfaction class or truth predicate for first-
order set-theoretic assertions, if it consists of pairs 〈ϕ,~a〉 where ϕ is a first-order
formula in the language of set theory and ~a is a valuation of the free-variables of ϕ
to actual objects in the set-theoretic universe V , such that the Tarskian recursion
is satisfied:
(a) Tr judges the truth of atomic statements correctly:
Tr(x = y, 〈a, b〉) if and only if a = b
Tr(x ∈ y, 〈a, b〉) if and only if a ∈ b
(b) Tr performs Boolean logic correctly:
Tr(ϕ ∧ ψ,~a) if and only if Tr(ϕ,~a) and Tr(ψ,~a)
Tr(¬ϕ,~a) if and only if ¬Tr(ϕ,~a)
(c) Tr performs quantifier logic correctly:
Tr(∀xϕ,~a) if and only if ∀b Tr(ϕ, b a ~a)
In any model 〈M,∈,Tr〉 equipped with such a truth predicate, an easy induction on
formulas shows that Tr(ϕ,~a) if and only if M |= ϕ[~a], for any (standard) formula
ϕ in the language of set theory. (In ω-nonstandard models, the truth predicate
will also involve nonstandard formulas.) Tarski famously proved that no model
of set theory can have a definable truth predicate, even with parameters. Please
see [GHHSW17] for further discussion of truth predicates of various kinds in the
Go¨del-Bernays GBC set theory context.
If κ is an inaccessible cardinal, then Vκ is a model of ZFC and indeed a model
of Kelley-Morse set theory KM, when equipped with all its subsets as classes, and
among these is a truth predicate for the structure 〈Vκ,∈〉. Indeed, KM itself implies
the existence of a truth predicate for first-order truth, as explained in [Ham14], and
we don’t actually need the full power of KM for this, since the principle of elemen-
tary transfinite recursion ETR, and indeed, already a small fragment ETRω suffices,
1This argument is more subtle than it may at first appear, since the claim is that this works in
every model of ZFC, including the ω-nonstandard models. The subtle issues are first, that perhaps
the finite sequence of ordinals ~α isn’t really finite, but only nonstandard finite; and second, perhaps
the formula ϕ itself isn’t a standard-length formula, but is a nonstandard formula, which we cannot
use to define a in V externally. The first issue can be resolved by using the internal pairing function
of the model to replace ~α with a single ordinal α = p~αq that codes it, thereby reducing to the case
of one ordinal parameter. (In fact, one can omit the need for any ordinal parameter at all other
than θ, by coding information into θ.) The second issue is resolved simply by taking the Go¨del
code pϕq as an additional parameter. Since this is a natural number, it is an ordinal and therefore
can be used as an ordinal parameter. So a is the unique object in V for which ϕ(a, ~α) holds in
Vθ, which is expressible in V as a property of a, θ, p~αq and pϕq. So it is ordinal-definable.
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a principle weaker than the principle of clopen determinacy for class games [GH16].
But it is not provable in GBC. So the existence of a truth predicate is a mild
extension of GBC in the direction of ETR on the way to KM.
The article [GHHSW17] also makes clear exactly what it means to say in GBC
that a class forcing notion P admits a forcing relation for a first-order formula ϕ.
For example, to admit a forcing relation for the atomic formulas x ∈ y, x = y,
means to have a class relation  for which the instances p  τ ∈ σ and p  τ = σ
obey the desired recursive properties, much like having a truth predicate. And
there are similar recursive requirements for a forcing relation for any given formula
p  ϕ(τ). Furthermore, the difficulty of the existence of forcing relations is present
entirely in the atomic case, for if a class forcing notion P admits a forcing relation
for the atomic formulas, then it has forcing relations p  ϕ(~τ ) for any specific
first-order formula ϕ (see [GHHSW17, theorem 5]). When a class forcing notion
admits a forcing relation, then it follows as a consequence that forced statements
are true in the forcing extensions and true statements are forced, in the expected
manner (see [GHHSW17, section 3]). Meanwhile, the main result of [GHHSW17]
shows that the assertion that every class forcing notion P admits a forcing relation
for atomic formulas is equivalent to the principle ETROrd, and this in turn implies
the existence of various kinds of truth predicates and even iterated truth predicates
and furthermore, that every forcing notion P admits a uniform forcing relation that
works with all formulas ϕ simultaneously.
3. The main theorem
Let us now prove the main theorem. We shall prove a sequence of variations of
it, beginning with an argument which achieves some greater transparency (and the
stronger conclusion of a transitive model) by making use of an inaccessible cardinal,
a mild extra assumption that will be weakened and ultimately omitted in the later
variations.
Theorem 3. If there is an inaccessible cardinal, then there is transitive model of
ZFC which does not arise as a class-forcing extension of its HOD by any class
forcing notion with definable forcing relations in that HOD.
Proof. Suppose that κ is inaccessible, and assume without loss that V = L, by
moving if necessary to the constructible universe L. Consider the model Vκ, which
is the same as Lκ and which is a model of ZFC. Since κ is inaccessible, we may
augment this model with all its subsets 〈Vκ,∈, Vκ+1〉, which will be a model of
the second-order Kelley-Morse KM set theory and therefore also a model of Go¨del-
Bernays GBC set theory. Let Tr = { 〈ϕ,~a〉 | Vκ |= ϕ[~a] } be the satisfaction relation
for Vκ, which is defined by the Tarski recursion in V ; this is one of the classes in
the KM model. Let T ⊆ κ be a class of ordinals that codes the class Tr in some
canonical manner, such as by including α if and only if the αth element in the L-
order is a pair 〈ϕ,~a〉 that is in Tr. Note that every initial segment T ∩ γ for γ < κ
is an element of Lκ, since it is the γ-initial segment of the truth predicate of some
Lθ ≺ Lκ, which is of course in Lκ. The set T is a class in our model 〈Vκ,∈, Vκ+1〉,
but in light of Tarski’s theorem it is not first-order definable in the first-order part
of this model 〈Vκ,∈〉.
Let δα = ℵω·(α+1)+1 for α < κ; these will constitute a definable sequence of reg-
ular cardinals to be used as ‘coding points,’ and sufficiently scattered to avoid any
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possible interference (this scattering is not strictly necessary, but it makes matters
clear). Consider now the Easton-support product forcing P =
∏
α∈T Add(δα, 1),
which adds a Cohen subset to each δα for α ∈ T . This is set-forcing in V , but
definable class forcing in our model Vκ; it is a very well understood forcing notion,
and the standard Easton forcing factor arguments show that it preserves all car-
dinals and cofinalities of V and that it preserves the inaccessibility of the cardinal
κ. Because the forcing is pre-tame, the forcing relations p P ϕ(~τ ) for this forcing
notion over Vκ are definable using class parameter T in Vκ. Suppose that G ⊆ P
is V -generic for this forcing, and in V [G] we may consider the model 〈Vκ[G],∈〉,
where we have now discarded all the classes and consider it merely as a ZFC model.
We claim first that HODVκ[G] = Vκ. Since Vκ = Lκ, of course we have the inclu-
sion Vκ ⊆ HOD
Vκ[G]. Conversely, notice that the forcing P is weakly homogeneous
in V , which means that for any two conditions p and q there is an automorphism of
the forcing π for which π(p) is compatible with q—one simply flips bits on the rele-
vant coordinates in order to bring the conditions into compatibility. Since p  ϕ(αˇ)
if and only if π(p)  ϕ(αˇ), it follows that any statement in the forcing language
about check-names will be forced either by all conditions or none. Since every ordi-
nal in the extension has a check name, it follows that every ordinal-definable set in
Vκ[G] is ordinal-definable in Vκ from the forcing relation, which is definable from
T . Since any set in HOD is coded by such a set of ordinals in HOD, it follows that
every set in HODVκ[G] is definable from set parameters in the structure 〈Vκ,∈, T 〉
and in particular, it is an element of Vκ, since this structure satisfies the separation
axiom. So HODVκ[G] = Vκ = Lκ.
Next, we notice that T is first-order definable in the extension Vκ[G], since it is
precisely the collection of ordinals α for which there is in Vκ[G] an L-generic Cohen
subset of δα, using the fact that the map α 7→ δα is definable in a way that is
absolute between Vκ and Vκ[G]. The forcing G ⊆ P explicitly added such a generic
set for each α ∈ T and an easy factor argument shows that when α /∈ T , there
can be no such L-generic Cohen subset of δα in Vκ[G], since it cannot be added
by the tail forcing, which is closed, and it cannot be added by the smaller factors,
by the chain condition, since the forcing below δα is too small on account of the
scattering. So the class T is first-order definable in V [G]. Consequently also, the
Vκ-truth predicate Tr is definable as well, since this is definable from T .
Lastly, we claim that there can be no forcing notion Q ⊆ Vκ having definable
forcing relations in Vκ, such that Vκ[G] arises as a forcing extension Vκ[H ] by some
Vκ-generic filter H ⊆ Q. Suppose toward contradiction that there is. Note that
Q itself, being the domain of its forcing relations, is also definable. Since Tr is
definable in Vκ[H ] and fulfills the Tarskian recursion for being a truth predicate for
Lκ, there must be some condition q ∈ Q forcing with respect to Q over Lκ that
a certain definition ψ(x, ~y) defines a truth predicate for Lκ. Since Tr is the only
class that fulfills the property of being an Lκ-truth predicate—it is unique in all
forcing extensions of Vκ and indeed of V—it follows that all conditions r ≤ q must
force exactly the same information about instances of ψ(x, ~y), since this information
must accord with Tr. Thus, Tr(ϕ,~a) holds just in case there is in Vκ some r ≤ q
with r Q ψ(ϕ, ~ˇa). Since we assumed that the Q order and the instances of the
forcing relation Q are definable classes in Vκ, it would follow that Tr is definable
in Vκ, contrary to Tarski’s theorem.
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So the model Vκ[G] in the forcing extension V [G] is an instance of what is desired,
a transitive model of ZFC that does not arise as a class-forcing extension of its HOD
by any definable class forcing notion with a definable forcing relation, because
it admits a definable truth predicate for its HOD. It follows by a Lo¨wenheim-
Skolem argument that there is also a countable transitive model instance of the
phenomenon, and this is a Σ12 assertion in V [G], which must therefore also be true
in the original model V . So there is such a transitive model of ZFC in V that is
not a class-forcing extension of its HOD, as desired. 
Let us now explain how to improve the argument by weakening the large cardinal
hypothesis. The first thing to notice is that we don’t really need the inaccessible
cardinal, if we fall back merely on the assumption in GBC that there is a first-
order truth predicate. The observations in section 2 show that this assumption is
strictly weaker in consistency strength (if consistent) than ZFC plus an inaccessible
cardinal, since it is provable in KM and even in GBC+ETRω, a slight strengthening
of GBC. With this weaker assumption, however, we no longer get a transitive model
with the desired property, although if we had assumed a transitive model with a
truth-predicate, a hypothesis that still remains weaker in consistency strength than
an inaccessible cardinal, then the final model would also be transitive.
Theorem 4. If there is a model of GBC having a truth-predicate for first-order
truth, then there is a model of ZFC which is not a class-forcing extension of its
HOD by any class forcing notion with definable forcing relations in that HOD.
Proof. Let’s simply work inside the model, that is, in GBC under the assumption
that there is a truth predicate class Tr, a class (necessarily not first-order definable)
obeying the Tarski recursion. Using Tr we may construct a truth predicate TrL for
L, and this truth predicate is strongly amenable to L, in the sense that if we move
to L and take the classes definable in the structure 〈L,∈,TrL〉, we will retain GBC.
To see this, notice first that by the reflection theorem, there are ordinals θ for which
〈Lθ,∈,Tr
L ∩Lθ〉 is Σ1-elementary in 〈L,∈,Tr
L〉, and this implies that TrL ∩Lθ is
the (unique) truth predicate for 〈Lθ,∈〉, which is an element of L. Since by reflection
sets defined in 〈L,∈,TrL〉 are also definable in some initial segment 〈Lθ,∈,Tr
L ∩Lθ〉,
it follows that they are all in L, and so 〈L,∈,TrL〉 with its definable classes forms
a model of GBC. In short, we may assume V = L without loss.
Next, as in theorem 3, let T ⊆ Ord be a class of ordinals that codes TrL in some
canonical way, and let P =
∏
α∈T Add(δα, 1) be the Easton-support product forcing
that adds a Cohen subset to δα = ℵω(α+1)+1 for all and only the α ∈ T . If G ⊆ P
is L-generic, we may form the extension L[G], which satisfies ZFC. As before, the
homogeneity argument will establish HODV [G] = V = L. And the class T will
be definable in L[G] as before, but there can be no class forcing notion definable
in L with definable forcing relations in L, because from such a forcing relation we
would as before be able to define T and therefore TrL in L, contrary to Tarski’s
theorem. 
Ultimately, this proof relies on the fact that TrL is not explicitly first-order
definable in Lκ, although it is nevertheless implicitly first-order definable in 〈Lκ,∈〉,
in the sense of [HL16] and [GH17], meaning that TrL is the unique class even in
the extension satisfying a particular first-order expressible property in the language
with a class predicate. Namely, TrL is the unique class satisfying the (first-order
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expressible) property of what it means to be a truth predicate, the Tarski recursion,
for the ground model, and furthermore this uniqueness continues to hold in the
extension.
Let us now finally prove the main theorem under the optimal hypothesis.
Theorem 5. If ZFC is consistent, then there is a model of ZFC that is not a class-
forcing extension of its HOD by any class forcing notion with definable forcing
relations in that HOD.
Proof. Assume that ZFC is consistent. It follows that there is a countable ω-
nonstandard model of set theory 〈M,∈M ,Tr∗〉 having a partial truth predicate Tr∗
which is defined on the Σn-assertions of the model for some nonstandard n, obeying
the Tarski recursion on its domain, and where the model satisfies ZFC in the lan-
guage with the predicate Tr∗. There is such a model because the theory asserting
ZFC in the expanded language plus the assertion that Tr∗ is a partial truth class de-
fined on the Σ1 assertions, the Σ2-assertions and so on, is finitely consistent and so
it has a model. (But actually, a more general fact is that any countable computable
saturated model 〈M,∈M 〉 can be expanded to include such a partial truth predi-
cate, and furthermore this characterizes the computably saturated models amongst
countable models.)
Even though Tr∗ is only a partial truth predicate, nevertheless Tarski’s theorem
on the nondefinability of truth still goes through to show that Tr∗ is not definable
from parameters in 〈M,∈M 〉, since Tr∗ must agree with the actual satisfaction
relation on standard-finite formulas. (See [HY] for examples of the bizarre features
that nonstandard truth predicates can exhibit.)
We now simply undertake the argument of theorem 4 using the predicate Tr∗
instead of a full truth predicate. Namely, we may assume V = L inM without loss,
and then let T ⊆ Ord be a class of ordinals coding Tr∗, and then force with P so
as to code T by the class of cardinals for which there is an L-generic Cohen subset.
Again we will have HODM [G] =M by homogeneity, and so T and hence Tr∗ will be
definable in the forcing extension M [G]. But the standard-finite instances of Tr∗
are uniquely determined by actual truth in 〈M,∈M 〉, and so if the forcing relation is
definable, we will be able to define a partial satisfaction class in 〈M,∈M 〉, contrary
to Tarski’s theorem. So M [G] cannot be realized as a class-forcing extension of
its HOD by any class forcing notion definable in its HOD with definable forcing
relations there. 
4. What the argument does not show
A key idea of the main theorem is that we have a model of set theory and a class
T ⊂ Ord that was first-order definable in our larger model, but was not first-order
definable in HOD.
We should like briefly to explain that those features alone are not sufficient to
conclude that the universe is not a class-forcing extension of HOD. For example, we
might have started in L, and then forced to add a generic Cohen subclass A ⊆ Ord,
using set-sized conditions, that is, using the partial order 2<Ord. It is not difficult
to see that A is not definable in L. Next, we could force over the GBC model L[A]
to code A into the class of ordinals α for which there is an L-generic Cohen subset
of δα, as before. In the resulting forcing extension L[A][G], the class A has become
first-order definable. As a ZFC model, it is the same as 〈L[G],∈〉, since the forcing
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to add A added no sets. Since the coding forcing is weakly homogeneous, it follows
as before that HODL[G] = L. So this is a case where we had a nondefinable class in
L[A], which became definable in the forcing extension L[G]. But nevertheless, the
model L[G] is a class-forcing extension of L, since one can combine the two forcing
notions into one class forcing notion, whose conditions specify an initial segment of
A and a condition in the corresponding forcing to begin coding that initial segment.
The conclusion is that one may not deduce that V is not a class-forcing extension
of HOD merely by having a definable class of ordinals in V that is not definable in
HOD. What we had used about the truth predicate Tr was not only that it was not
definable, but that it would remain unique in all extensions of our original ground
model. This is how we knew that all conditions in the forcing must agree on the
particular details of the content of Tr, and so from the definability of the forcing
relation we get Tr definable in the ground model, contrary to Tarski’s theorem.
So what was used about Tr was that it was not only implicitly definable in the
extension, but necessarily implicitly definable in any possible extension.
We could have argued alternatively that if a partial truth predicate for the ground
model becomes definable in a forcing extension whose forcing relations are definable,
then since the truth values of Σk formulas uniquely determines the truth values of
Σk+1 formulas, it follows by induction on k that all conditions must force the same
truth values for all Σk formulas for all k, since there can be no least counterexample
to this. Thus, the truth predicate would be definable already in the ground model,
contrary to Tarski’s theorem.
5. Friedman’s theorem
Let us now turn to Friedman’s theorem [Fri12], which shows a sense in which
one can attain a positive answer to the main question in the introduction.
Theorem 6 (Friedman [Fri12]). There is a class A, definable in V and amenable to
HOD in the sense that 〈HOD,∈, A〉 satisfies ZFC in the expanded language, such
that V is a class-forcing extension of 〈HOD,∈, A〉 by a forcing notion P that is
definable in 〈HOD,∈, A〉 and which has a definable forcing relation there.
In other words, there is a class filter G ⊆ P meeting every dense class definable
in 〈HOD,∈, A〉 such that V = HOD[G], meaning that every set a ∈ V is the value
of a name a = val(a˙, G) for some name a˙ ∈ HOD.
This theorem can be seen as a positive answer to the main question, since it pro-
vides a way to amalgamate all the various set-forcing extensions HOD[G] provided
by Vopeˇnka’s theorem into one grand class forcing notion. The downside of the
theorem is that the forcing notion P and its forcing relation P are not necessarily
available as classes in HOD, if one should consider HOD purely as a ZFC model.
So this isn’t the usual kind of case of class forcing that one imagines in ZFC, where
we have a ground model and a definable class forcing notion, to be used to make a
forcing extension. Rather, for this case, we have the extension universe V already
and we can only define the forcing notion P in the extension V , and then observe
that indeed it is possible to amend HOD by this forcing notion in such a way so as
to realize V as the extension.
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6. The mantle
It turns out that our main result also answers the following natural analogue
of the main question in the area of set-theoretic geology, namely, the question of
whether the set-theoretic universe V must arise by class forcing over the mantle.
The subject of set-theoretic geology, introduced in [FHR15], is the study of the
collection and structure of the ground models of the universe. A transitive inner
model W |= ZFC is a ground of the set-theoretic universe V if there is some forcing
notion P ∈ W and W -generic filter G ⊆ P for which V = W [G] is the resulting
forcing extension. The ground-model definability theorem, due to Laver [Lav07]
and Woodin [Woo04] (Laver [Lav07] uses a proof due to Hamkins), asserts that
every such ground model W is definable from parameters in V . The ground-model
enumeration theorem [FHR15, theorem 12] asserts that there is a definable class
W ⊆ V × V whose sections Wr = { x | (r, x) ∈W } are all ground models of V and
every ground model of V is such a Wr. In this way, quantifying over the ground
models becomes a first-order quantifier, by quantifying over the indices r that give
rise to the various ground models Wr .
The mantle M is simply the intersection of all ground models M =
⋂
rWr, which
is a definable class in light of the ground-model enumeration theorem. Results
in [FHR15], when combined with Usuba [Usu17], show that the mantle is an inner
model of ZFC, and indeed, it is the largest forcing-invariant definable class.
Since the mantle arises through the process of stripping away the various forcing
extensions that had given rise to the universe V , it is natural to inquire:
Question 7. Is the set-theoretic universe V necessarily a class-forcing extension
of the mantle?
This is an analogue of the main question in the context of set-theoretic geology,
and we intend again that the question is asking whether there must be a class
forcing notion P definable in the mantle and with definable forcing relations there,
such that V arises as a forcing extension V = M[G] for some M-generic G ⊆ P.
Once again, the answer is negative.
Theorem 8. If ZFC is consistent, then there is a model of ZFC that does not
arise as a class-forcing extension of its mantle M by any class forcing notion with
definable forcing relations in M.
Proof. We may use the same arguments as in theorems 3, 4 and 5, because in those
cases, the mantle of the resulting final model will be the same as its HOD. The
point is that since the forcing there was an Easton-support product forcing over L,
one may strip off any particular factor or set of factors of the forcing and thereby
achieve a ground. That is, the final model L[G] is obtained by set-forcing over
the tail-forcing ground L[Gκ], where Gκ performs the forcing only at factors κ and
above. The intersection of these tail-forcing grounds is simply L, and so the mantle
of the model is L, which as we argued before, is the same as the HOD of the model.
Thus, the previous arguments show in those cases that the universe is not obtained
by class-forcing over the mantle. 
7. The intermediate model theorem
Let us now explain how our main theorem provides some simple counterexamples
to the class-forcing analogue of the intermediate-model theorem, the assertion that
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any ZFC model intermediate between a ground and a forcing extension is also a
forcing extension of that ground. In the case of set-forcing, the basic fact is familiar:
Theorem 9 ([Jec03, corollary 15.43]). If M ⊆W ⊆M [G] are ZFC models, where
M [G] is a forcing extension of M by set-sized forcing in M and W is an inner
model of M [G], then W is also a forcing extension of M and a ground of M [G].
Furthermore, if G ⊆ B is M -generic over a complete Boolean algebra B ∈ M ,
then there is a complete subalgebra B0 ⊆ B in M such that W = M [G0] is the
forcing extension via G0 = G∩B0, and consequently alsoM [G] is a forcing extension
of W by the quotient forcing.
It is natural to inquire whether the property holds for class-forcing extensions.
Question 10. Does the intermediate-model property hold for class forcing? In
other words, if V ⊆ V [G] is a class-forcing extension of the universe V and W
is a transitive ZFC model with V ⊆ W ⊆ V [G], then must W be a class-forcing
extension of V ? Must W be a ground of V [G]?
The answer to both of these questions is no, if one insists that the forcing notions
be definable classes in V with definable forcing relations there. Let us begin with
the simplest kind of counterexample.
Theorem 11. If ZFC is consistent, then there are models of ZFC set theory V ⊆
W ⊆ V [G], where V [G] is a class-forcing extension of V and W is a transitive
inner model of V [G], but W is not a forcing extension of V by any class forcing
notion with definable forcing relations in V .
Proof. Let us start with any GBC model V having a partial satisfaction class Tr∗,
and by further forcing if necessary, let us assume that the GCH holds. (This
situation is equiconsistent with ZFC, as we argued in theorem 5.) Let T ⊆ Ord
be a class of ordinals coding Tr∗ and let W = V [G0] be the forcing extension
that forces with the Easton-support product forcing so as to code T into the GCH
pattern on the regular cardinals. Let V [G] be the forcing extension that performs
the GCH failure forcing at all the other regular cardinals as well, effectively erasing
the coding.
Now, we throw away all the classes and consider V ⊆W ⊆ V [G] as ZFC models.
Note that V [G] is a class-forcing extension of V by the Easton-support product
forcing
∏
γ Add(γ, γ
++) forcing the failure of the GCH at every regular cardinal γ.
This forcing is definable and tame in V and has definable forcing relations there.
But W cannot arise as such a forcing extension of V , since T and hence Tr∗ are
definable in W , and from this it implies by (internal) induction on formulas that
all conditions must force the same outcomes for that truth predicate, and so Tr∗
would be definable in the ground model V , contrary to Tarski’s theorem. 
Failures of the intermediate-model property for class forcing were already pro-
vided by S. Friedman [Fri99], where he used 0♯ to construct counterexamples. Our
example here, however, appears to be considerably simpler and we have omitted
the use of 0♯. In addition, our method works over models of arbitrary consis-
tent first-order extensions of GBC, because every consistent extension of GBC has
models with a partial satisfaction class Tr∗, and this enables the construction of
theorem 11. In particular, there is no way to avoid the counterexamples by making
large cardinal assumptions or other first-order assumptions about the nature of the
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ground model V . The forcing in our example is also comparatively mild, a progres-
sively closed Easton-support product (and see theorem 13, where we realize it via
an Ord-c.c. complete Boolean algebra class). In theorem 14, we provide a coun-
terexample violating the class-forcing intermediate model property simultaneously
in both directions.
One might hope to avoid the counterexamples by making stronger assumptions
on the nature of the forcing giving rise to the extension V [G]. For example, since
the standard proof of theorem 9 in the set-forcing case makes fundamental use
of the Boolean algebra for the forcing, rather than just the forcing notion as a
partial order, one might hope that the intermediate-model property would hold for
instances of class forcing where the forcing notion is a complete Boolean algebra.
Question 12. If V ⊆ W ⊆ V [G], where G ⊆ B is V -generic for a definable class
forcing notion B, which is an Ord-c.c. complete class Boolean algebra in V and W
is a ZFC-inner model of V [G], then must W be a forcing extension of V ? Must W
be a ground of V [G]?
The answer is negative. We are grateful to Victoria Gitman for discussions and
observations concerning this question and for her suggestion to consider “Ord is
Mahlo.”
Theorem 13. If ZFC + “Ord is Mahlo” is consistent, then there are models of
ZFC set theory V ⊆ W ⊆ V [G], where G ⊆ B is V -generic by a tame definable
Ord-c.c. complete Boolean algebra class B, but W is not a forcing extension of V
by any definable class forcing notion with definable forcing relations in V .
Proof. The point is that if Ord is Mahlo, then the Easton-support product forcing
used in the proof of theorem 11 is Ord-c.c., by the class analogue of the usual
proof that the Easton-support product of small forcing up to a Mahlo cardinal κ
is κ-c.c. Since the forcing is tame, it has a definable forcing relation, and therefore
by [GHHSW17, theorem 14] it has a definable set-complete Boolean completion.
Since the forcing is Ord-c.c., set-complete means fully complete. So when Ord is
Mahlo, the class forcing B used in theorem 11 can be taken to be a complete Boolean
algebra. But still the argument of that theorem shows that the intermediate model
W cannot be a class-forcing extension of V by any class forcing notion with definable
forcing relations in V . 
So far, the counterexamples provided by theorems 11 and 13 violate only one part
of the intermediate-model property. Namely, in the set-forcing case, when V ⊆W ⊆
V [G] is an intermediate model for set-sized forcing, then the intermediate model
W is both a forcing extension of V and a ground of V [G]. In our counterexamples
above, we only showed that W is not a forcing extension of V . And in those cases,
W was in fact a ground model of V [G], since the rest of the forcing fromW to V [G]
was in fact definable in W .
Similar arguments, however, provide a dual kind of counterexample, with V ⊆
W ⊆ V [G], but where W is not a ground of V [G] by any class forcing notion
definable in W and with definable forcing relations there. Namely, in order to
achieve this, let V = L[GT ], where the class T coding Tr
L is coded. Next, do the
erasing forcing to W = L[G], which arises as an ordinary Easton-support product
of Cohen forcing. So the class T will no longer be definable in W . Finally, form
V [G] = W [HT ] by coding T again, on a disjoint noninterfering class of coding
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points. The final model V [G] is a class-forcing extension of V = L[GT ], since T is
definable in V . But it is not a class-forcing extension of W , since T is not definable
there.
In order to provide a full counterexample to the class-forcing intermediate model
property V ⊆ W ⊆ V [G], where simultaneously W is not a class-forcing extension
of V and also not a ground of V [G], we have to push the methods a bit harder.
Theorem 14. If ZFC is consistent, then there are models of ZFC set theory
V ⊆W ⊆ V [G],
where V [G] is a class-forcing extension of V and W is an inner model of V [G],
transitive with respect to V [G], but W is neither a forcing extension of V nor a
ground of V [G] by any class forcing notion with definable forcing relations in these
respective ground models. If ZFC + Ord is Mahlo is consistent, then one can find
such instances where also V ⊆ V [G] is a generic extension by G ⊆ B, where B is
an Ord-c.c. complete Boolean algebra class definable in V .
Proof. If ZFC is consistent, then so is GBC and furthermore, we have mentioned
that there is a model of GBC with a partial satisfaction class, which is a truth
predicate defined on the Σn formulas for some nonstandard n and obeying the
Tarskian recursion up to that level. Note that any truth predicate defined up to
Σn can be extended uniquely to Σn+1 by unwrapping one additional level of the
Tarski recursion.
Since truth predicates are not definable, it follows from classical results of Kra-
jewski [Kra74; Kra76] (see also [HY]) that there is a modelM |= ZFC+V = L with
two different partial satisfaction classes Tr0 and Tr1, defined on all Σn formulas for
some n, which disagree on truth at some level and which are both ZFC-amenable to
M . The model M is necessarily ω-nonstandard, since an induction on formulas in
the meta-theory shows that any two truth predicates must agree on the truth of all
standard formulas; so the formulas on which they disagree must be nonstandard.
A similar argument shows that there can be no least n where the disagreement
between Tr0 and Tr1 arises, and so the classes Tr0 and Tr1 cannot be jointly ZFC-
amenable to M , since in 〈M,∈,Tr0,Tr1〉 we would thereby violate induction in
the natural numbers. But considered separately, the structures 〈M,∈,Tr0〉 and
〈M,∈,Tr1〉 satisfy ZFC in the expanded language and constitute GBC models with
their definable classes in the expanded language.
Let’s now construct the desired counterexample. Fix three disjoint scattered
non-interfering proper classes of coding points, γα, δα, ηα, which are all regular
cardinals in M and where the enumeration definitions are absolute.
We begin with the structure 〈M,∈,Tr0〉. Using the first class of coding points
γα, let M [G0] be a forcing extension of 〈M,∈,Tr0〉 in which the class Tr0 becomes
definable, by means of the Easton-support product of the forcing that adds a generic
Cohen subset to γα whenever α is the code of an element of Tr0. After this, let
us force to ‘erase’ this coding, by adding Cohen subsets to all the remaining γα,
so that the combined forcing simply adds Cohen subsets to every γα. So M ⊆
M [G0] ⊆M [G], where G is M -generic for the Easton-support product forcing that
adds a subset to every γα. We may assume that G is not only M -generic but also
〈M,∈,Tr0〉-generic and 〈M,∈,Tr1〉-generic, if we simply construct G first and then
construct G0 from it by restricting to the coordinates coding elements of Tr0.
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Next, viewing M [G] as a GBC model having arisen as a forcing extension of
〈M,∈,Tr1〉, we force over M [G] to M [G][H0], where Tr1 becomes coded by H0 on
the coding points δα. And then we perform the erasing forcing, adding Cohen sets
to all the remaining δα, to form the extensionM [G][H ]. The forcing to add H is the
Easton-support product of the forcing to add a Cohen subset to every δα, and this
forcing is definable in M with a definable forcing relation there. We may assume
that G×H is not only M -generic, but also 〈M,∈,Tr0〉 and 〈M,∈,Tr1〉-generic, by
selecting G and H first and then restricting to G0 and H0.
Finally, viewing M [G][H ] as a GBC forcing extension of 〈M,∈,Tr0〉, we force to
code Tr0 once again on the coding points ηα with filter K0, forming the extension
M [G][H ][K0].
The full chain of forcing extensions is
M ⊆M [G0] ⊆M [G] ⊆M [G][H0] ⊆M [G][H ] ⊆M [G][H ][K0],
and we view them now merely as ZFC models, throwing all the classes away. Con-
sider specifically the three models:
M [G0] ⊆ M [G][H0] ⊆ M [G][H ][K0].
Notice that since Tr0 is definable in M [G0], we may easily define in M [G0] the
forcing to the final model M [G][H ][K0], since this is just the erasing forcing on the
γα, the full forcing on the δα, and then the forcing to code Tr0 again on the ηα. So
we have a ground model M [G0] and a forcing extension M [G][H ][K0] by definable
class forcing in that ground model with a definable forcing relation there.
But consider the intermediate model M [G][H0]. The truth predicate Tr1 is
definable there, being coded by H0 on the cardinals δα. If M [G][H0] could be
realized as a class-forcing extension of M [G0], by some class forcing notion with
definable forcing relations, then there would be some condition p forcing that the
existence of L-generic Cohen sets on the cardinals δα coded a partial satisfaction
class for M on the Σn formulas, the same (nonstandard) n as in Tr1. In M [G0],
we may consider which truths were forced by which conditions in this forcing. By
(internal) induction on formulas, it follows that all conditions below p must force
the same truth values for any particular formula in the truth predicate coded on
the δα, since this is true for the atomic formulas and inductively if all conditions
force the same outcome for the subformulas of a formula, then they also force the
same outcome for the formula itself by the Tarski recursion. Therefore, Tr1 must be
definable in M [G0], where Tr0 is also definable. But it is easy to see by induction
on formulas that all partial truth predicates must agree on their common domain,
contrary to our assumption via Krajewsky that Tr0 and Tr1 disagree. SoM [G][H0]
is not a class-forcing extension of M [G0] by any class forcing notion with definable
forcing relations in M [G0].
With exactly similar reasoning, we claim that the final model M [G][H ][K0] is
not a class-forcing extension of the intermediate model M [G][H0], because Tr1 is
definable in the intermediate model and Tr0 is definable in the final model. So
the intermediate model M [G][H0] is neither a forcing extension of M [G0] nor a
ground of M [G][H ][K0], even though it is between these two models, which form a
class-forcing extension.
If we had Ord is Mahlo in M , then just as in theorem 13 the forcing to go from
M [G0] to M [G][H ][K0] would be Ord-c.c., and therefore could be realized as a
class-forcing extension by a complete Boolean algebra class. 
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If we had assumed that GBC was relatively consistent with the existence of a
truth predicate, a mild extra assumption that is weaker than GBC+ETRω, which
lies strictly below Kelley-Morse set theory, then we could have avoided the fuss in
the argument about partial truth predicates and worked instead with distinct full
truth predicates.
We do not yet know how to arrange counterexamples of the kind mentioned in
theorem 14 with transitive models.
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